

### Asymmetries of GVN and VC problems

Both are said to need ~~xxx~~ to win the support and commitment of the people. But:

VC need support of people (which they "organize" rather than "win") to survive and operate: GVN troops and central, much less.

GVN needs not only support but commitment (which must be "won" as well as organized) to keep VC political machine from returning, once neutralized, to counterbalance guerrillas, to get people to take risks and deny support to VC organization.

Small, unconventional VC forces can survive almost everywhere; large, conventional VC forces cannot.

Large, conventional ARVN forces can survive and operate almost everywhere; small, conventional RVNAF units cannot.

Thus: GVN-controlled areas characterized by absence of large VC forces (and high risk for small VC units); VC-controlled by absence of small GVN units (low risk for small VC units, moderate to low for large VC units). "Contested" areas find both large VC units operating (intermittently; and, with some risk); and small GVN units (in some parts). (What are usually called "contested" may be areas that large ARVN units do enter occasionally, in contrast to "VC" areas where ARVN doesn't really enter at all; yet if ~~xxxxxxx~~ small units do not regularly protect ~~xx~~ GVN officials in these areas, VC are likely to administer area almost as thoroughly as "VC" area.

(Thus, control can't be defined wholly in terms of presence or absence of military units: large VC units might be kept out by presence of large ARVN units, while VC guerrillas were unchallenged by RF/PF units and ~~xx~~ GVN officials were absent or acquiescent to VC.)



Barlow: current police system. Reason for lack (built up CIO). no career, low pay, incentive to make money, short training (England 3 month, Malaya 6, Africa 9: without weapons). Back SBP only in November.

Vs. assassination. Vs. Comm organization.

Root out infrastructure by police/intell action (mainly interrogations, documents: round-ups, raids): but people's org, democracy, welfare, etc. to keep them from returning: self-defense, cooperation with police (including info).

Get good people into police, retrain, pay, motivate, change image.

((But: numbers in short run; actual public image, so no one wants to associate. ))

(Diem coup: predictions of results; 5:3 on VC takeover in 18 months; predictions of coups. Rec: minimize turnover. But denunciations. Lou/Snplén and Khanh. Richardson: tranquilizers. OSA discredit after coup. ((those against, didn't predict bad things if coup occurred, but, in effect, good things if it didn't.))

(Invade North, to stop flow.

*Force Populaire. 1960-63*

*VNQDD, 1970: Section.*



Though numbers are flexible and would be tailored to local requirements, a standard Rural Construction Cadre Group will consist of leadership and staff (7), a People's Action Team (34), a Census Grievance team (6), Civil Affairs Team (6) and New Life Development team (6): 59 in all. The tasks of these elements are mutually supporting. The group will be recruited from the district where it is to work, trained at National Training Centers in both common subjects (including weapons handling, and political aspects and proper behavior) and specialties, and returned to the command of their province and district chiefs.

The composition and functioning of the team can best be understood in terms of a hierarchy of ~~requirements~~ <sup>requirements</sup> functions, ~~accomplishments~~ <sup>accomplishments</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>that</sup> must be performed. ~~Working down~~ <sup>From the top</sup> At the top of the pyramid is the crucial goal of the securing phase: the active participation of the hamlet/village/<sup>people</sup> in their own self-defense, in the variety of ways described earlier. But before they can be expected to take up energetically the risks ~~of this effort~~ of this effort, they must be shown and led toward a new rural status, a new ~~way of~~ life they feel impelled to defend: ~~effective~~ local self-government~~x~~ linked to a responsive national government, improving conditions, effective local~~x~~ organisations. In turn, to meet these requirements information must flow in two directions. <sup>Local authorities</sup> ~~The government~~ must come to know who the people are, their loyalties and relation to the current struggle, their abilities, and their aspirations and grievances. The people must <sup>learn</sup> ~~know~~ what the government can do and means to do for them, what it needs from them~~x~~ and why, how it proposes to support their own cooperative efforts. Finally: if the cadres are to learn about the people and teach the people about the government and the possibilities of self-help,



New points;

- ✓ 1. People's self-defense as goal of pacification effort.
- ✓ 2. Other functions as instrumental (though, Ky speech: moral duty)  
Democracy, development; organization, knowledge/of people and  
grievances; ~~xxxxxx~~ confidence of people, correct  
explanation behavior; protection of cadre.
3. Work not just on B villages but A (make model), and C (point  
to example, prepare to make into B and A).  
✓ Cities as examples; treatment of GVN families, pay.  
Show benefits of GVN rule: land reform, education, etc.  
NEED FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION
- ✓ 4. Need for much more information on aspirations of people.  
More communication between gov and people (presence,  
explanation, follow-up, recognition of achievement). Mutual  
responsibility (Ky on past lack). Co speech
- ✓ 5. Follow-up on CG findings on grievances:
- ✓ 6. Adapt GVN rural org to wartime conditions: need for more  
cadre, better trained and motivated, better paid, armed; willing  
to accept risk
7. Police role in all phases, areas. Census in C zone as well.
- 8. Problem of getting out VC political org, keeping it out,  
and getting people to resist VC demands ~~xxxxxxx~~ and  
propaganda, not just direct VC attacks:  
(first is mainly police task, helped by public; second  
and third require strong public involvement; none  
have strong military role. But can't be accomplished  
without effective military protection: by RVNAF (and  
that can't be provided without US/ARVN defeat of VC  
main force)).
- 9. Explain intent of paper: not critique of GVN plans or  
thinking ((actually meant to spread Chau ideas within GVN, and  
to explain to high-level US: not just to inform field)). *Not open  
of feasibility, or alternatives; began is only one response to problem.*
10. VC influence, even where they do not "control."  
Belief in Comm promises of retaliation more than GVN  
promises of protection and benefits.
- 11. Fish and water: ignores VC political organization, that  
supports and is supported by guerrillas. Organizes support,  
provides guerrillas with precise info to punish opposition;  
the fish do not swim in an ~~organized~~ unorganized sea of people,  
who provide support out of spontaneous mass sympathy. Must  
deprive guerrillas of this support (and deprive machine of guer.  
support) (in reverse order), by a) protecting police/cadres, as  
they (b) find and isolate machine, and (c) develop GVN machine  
to prevent return of VC apparatus.
12. Village program within context of national reform, and  
appeals to VC area (and activity against main force, and in  
VC area).
- 13. Improve behavior of RVNAF



Requirements:

hamlet/village/district

1. Improved/security: which means commitment of RVNAF, including ARVN, to the task ~~of~~ and highly improved performance of RVNAF. ~~On the US side~~

2. Wise political guidance of the whole process, to ensure that ~~the way~~ efforts to improve security--the kinds of operations and the way they are conducted, the behavior of the troops, the way the effort is organized and the impact of that organization on civil government--~~the support~~ rather than negative efforts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this--which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria--means that the very process of providing security, still more the process of exploiting security gained, is constrained and prolonged, ~~it means~~ it means more lives, Vietnamese and American, must be expended to gain our ends, and the ends themselves are jeopardized

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3. On the Vietnamese side, civilian officials have shown themselves far more sensitive than the military to the political nature of the conflict and to the aspirations of the public that are related to their commitment on one side or the other. The current trend toward ~~increasing~~ increasing civilian influence and direct ~~participation~~ participation in government, from the village to the national level--which is itself a major aspiration of important parts of the <sup>public</sup> government--is thus ~~a~~ a very healthy and hopeful development for the political management of the pacification process on the Vietnamese side. In fact, this process--unforeseeable six months ago--is one of the very few genuinely hopeful developments in the whole Vietnamese scene. To block it or reverse it by the ~~example~~ example or the direct impact of the way we organize our management of US participation in the process would involve serious costs within Vietnam itself, costs that far overshadow the possible costs in terms of international or US domestic attitudes.

3. Although secondary to the above two considerations, improved management of both the military and civil efforts is a necessity, on both the American and Vietnamese sides.

Management of US participation in the pacification process is one variable we can control and improve in the short run. The following reorganization, in my opinion, meets the above requirements better than the current situation.



2. The government: limitations and trends toward constitutionality
  - a. Technical and administrative competence
  - b. Initiative and self-confidence
  - c. The structure of authority
  - d. Political organization and mobilization
  - e. The emerging political dialogue
3. Persistence of an insurgent movement as a rival political organization.
4. Disruption of the life lines (transportation, communication, commerce).
  - a. Political costs of disruption
  - b. Security, the determinant for restoration
5. Refugees and mass displacement of people
  - a. Size of the problem
  - b. Need for economic and social reintegration
6. Existence of a large military establishment
  - a. As the major authority structure
  - b. As a potential development asset
7. Growing availability of fungible resources for development
  - a. Size of military construction
  - b. Nature of contracting capacity
  - c. Convertibility to development purposes
8. Physical assets created by war
  - a. Types of assets
  - b. Attractions and limitations from the development point of view (e.g. random scattering, sunk costs vs. incremental costs)
9. The "Revolutionary Development" program
  - a. As an investment effort
  - b. As a vehicle for change
10. The Chinese community
  - a. Major source of venture capital
  - b. Traditional Vietnamese hostility



Gavin (Observer)  
Michael Wall, Guardian

((1. JUSPAO: uses WWII tactics against VC in psyway: as if there were a Channel between us and them; fly leaflets over, radio. In fact, use same techniques as on NVN.

2. Dealing with main force is no longer of absolutely overwhelming priority, like last year; other matters now deserve comparable attention, and not just inflation, cadre, etc. but the military problem posed by the guerrillas; the problem of building up the PF/RF and getting ARVN into pacification is now of comparable importance to the problem of getting more US in to fight main force.

Task 1: destroying main force~~x~~ (military, mainly US);

Task 2: eliminating VC domination of the countryside (maintain by machine plus guerrillas even before any main force buildup): military (ARVN/RF/PF)--police (PFF/RF)--intelligence, political, economic, etc.

Task 3: Keeping machine and guerrillas from returning, Primarily non-military (including police)

Mistake to think that Task 2 can be accomplished by cadre and non-military measures; unlike 3, military role is crucial; and unlike 1, military role must be performed by RVNAF. Hence, 3 will never be reached, and we will fail to eliminate Communist control of the countryside, (and economic/moral power over the cities) unless RVNAF performance is changed.)

Wall: impressed by tendency to throw enormous firepower against hamlets with a few snipers, instead of ground action.

Growing anti-VN feeling among servicemenx, who feel they're being robbed.

Battle of Saigon: STIF: Saigon Tea is Fini. Saigon Tea for 160 p is Number Ten. "173d, 1st Air Cav: those guys come in from the field, they're horny, they want some leg; but they say, 'If this is important to you, well, we'll stand with you.'" Since WWII, never have services stood together like this. We don't mind buying a tea--but 160 p every few minutes--I only get \$216 a month, that's a lot over here, but still, when they start charging 100-200 p for a 20p ride from TSN to Saigon. Now if it's 21 p and you give him 25, get 4p change of sit in the cab. *I'm just 20...*

Meet at the King at 7. Please don't carry placards or pickets or anything--this isn't a protest, or a sit-in, it has nothing to do with those...we're over here, we think we ought to be here, but..

we aren't allowed in the USAF to sign petitions or put up signs on the bulletin board... *50p*

Sgt. was overcharged at the Bristol, came back with buddies and closed it up by refusing to buy teas, two nights in a row. The Saigon Post wrote it up...

(Line of girls in front of Palace: MPs; madam claims ~~sh~~apped.

MPs nervous. "These aren't pacifists, man; they aren't just

sitting in. Tearing up seats.

*Other R+R Haves, just drink beer...*